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I 
INTRODUCTION 
When examining particular aspects of the work of defense counsel, 
especially at the international level, it is useful to first take a step back and 
consider the role and function of the defense in the system of criminal justice. 
Certain commonalities exist in the practices of defense counsel, regardless of 
the jurisdiction or legal system in operation. For one, the core obligation of a 
defense counsel is to provide effective representation to the client. This general 
obligation begs the question, What is meant by “effective representation”? 
Certainly, it entails a duty to provide objective legal advice to the client and to 
be an advocate on his behalf in all litigation. This necessarily encompasses 
written and oral advocacy on behalf of the client at all stages of the criminal 
process. 
The relationship between client and counsel is built upon trust and 
confidence, which must be fostered. Attorney–client privilege is the bedrock of 
this relationship. It is now well accepted that counsel must take instructions 
from a client and heed the objectives set by the client, to the extent that such 
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objectives are lawful and do not run afoul of rules of deontology.1 The strategy 
by which such lawful objectives are achieved is, however, a matter for counsel 
to determine, albeit that counsel necessarily has a duty to consult with and 
explain to the client the approach taken. 
 That much is uncontroversial. However, defense strategy is very often an 
area where equally equipped and experienced counsel may diverge. 
Accordingly, are there any general practices that can be discerned as “best 
practice” to guide counsel in deciding upon an appropriate defense strategy? At 
the very least, are there any challenges frequently encountered that commend a 
particular solution? 
As a general proposition, it should be recognized that defense work is not 
for the fainthearted. This is true in both domestic and international practice. In 
each, the typical defense team is outnumbered, out-resourced and overworked, 
and is defending individuals very often already convicted, by one-sided media 
coverage and popular sentiment in the court of public opinion. In the case of a 
client suspected or accused of committing international crimes, the public 
perception of the client’s guilt is often further magnified by the assistance of 
well-financed civil-society groups, nongovernmental organizations, and 
international media pushing a narrative that becomes accepted as the “truth” 
even before the client appears in court. How then can a defense counsel swim 
against the tide to provide effective representation to his or her client? 
Most essential, perhaps, is that defense counsel must understand not only 
his or her role, in a functional sense, in the criminal justice system, but also the 
manner in which a defense counsel must conduct him or herself while 
discharging this responsibility. It is apt to recall Robert F. Kennedy’s well-
known statement on the most essential quality of an attorney: “Courage is the 
most important attribute of a lawyer. . . . It can never be de-limited, dated or 
outworn, and it should pervade the heart, the halls of justice, and the chambers 
of the mind.”2 The eloquence of the formulation used by the former attorney 
general of the United States should not disguise the substance and truth 
underpinning his message. It was not a mere rhetorical flourish. A defense 
counsel must act courageously in defense of his or her client, to the extent 
permitted by the law and the applicable codes of ethics. Perhaps it is Lord 
Brougham who is best known for encapsulating the high duty counsel owes in 
discharge of his or her responsibilities. Lord Brougham’s submissions before the 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Code of Professional Conduct for 
Counsel, res. 1, art. 14(2), ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/4/Res.1 (Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
NR/rdonlyres/BD397ECF-8CA8-44EF-92C6-AB4BEBD55BE2/140121/ICCASP432Res1_English.pdf 
(“When representing a client, counsel shall: (a) Abide by the client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of his or her representation as long as they are not inconsistent with counsel’s duties under 
the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and this Code; and (b) Consult with the client on the 
means by which the objectives of his or her representation are to be pursued.”). 
 2.  RICHARD ZITRIN AND CAROL M. LANGFORD THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 1 (1999). 
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court when robustly defending Queen Caroline against King George IV in 1820 
do lean towards hyperbole on occasion, but the essential duty counsel owes to 
the client that he tried to convey both resonates and remains relevant today: 
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the discharge of 
that office, but one person in the world, that client and none other. To save that client 
by all expedient means,—to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others, 
and among others to himself,—is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and 
he must not regard the alarm—the suffering—the torment—the destruction—which 
he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those 
of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on reckless of the 
consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for 
his client’s protection!
3
 
Such traditional notions, garbed in rich language, may sometimes appear 
outdated and irrelevant in an age of electronic courts, electronic disclosure, and 
saturated media coverage. But rather than being quaint relics of a bygone age, 
they are qualities without which an accused cannot be adequately represented. 
They not only constitute values and, perhaps, even moral qualities personal to 
each advocate, but also provide touchstones of principle that can guide a 
counsel’s path and enhance justice when applied consistently by the defense 
bar. Accordingly, when examining the practices of the defense before the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)—or any court—it is important to always 
keep in mind these core principles with which a defense counsel must act to 
provide effective representation to his or her client. 
It is impossible to commence a discussion of defense practices before the 
ICC without acknowledging the critical role played by the ad hoc and hybrid 
courts and tribunals in the establishment and work of the ICC. That said, it is 
important to recognize that the ICC is, foundationally, quite different than its 
sister ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals and courts—namely, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),4 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),5 the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL),6 the Special Panel for Serious Crimes (SPSC),7 the Special 
 
 3.  HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, Speeches in Defence of Her Majesty Queen Caroline, in 1 
SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM 105 (1838) (quoted in Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent Doyle, 
Where did the Zeal go?, 38 LITIG. 1, 2 (2011)). 
 4.  See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] 
(establishing the ICTY). 
 5.   See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] 
(establishing the ICTR). 
 6.   See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (requesting “the [UN] Secretary-
General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent 
special court consistent with this resolution”). The UN Secretary-General did in fact establish the 
SCSL. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 6, 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, attachment, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, art. 11 (Jan. 16, 2002) 
[hereinafter SCSL Statute]. 
 7.  See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which in turn established the SPSC). The 
UNTAET established the SPSC in 2000. See United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
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Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),8 and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC).9 The ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals and courts, 
as their titles generally indicate, were created to investigate and prosecute 
persons alleged to have been responsible for the commission of international 
crimes—crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and, in the case of the 
STL, serious violations of the Lebanese Criminal Code, including terrorism10—
that had taken or were taking place within the particular states over which these 
judicial entities exercised jurisdiction at particular times. 
The ICC, by contrast, is a permanent and global international criminal 
institution whose historical and societal importance,11 fundamental purpose,12 
and complementarity of jurisdiction13 are all recognized in the preamble to its 
statute. In addition, the process of establishing and governing the ICC, a treaty-
based organization with the above-mentioned goals and purpose, has involved a 
much wider range of actors than that involved in the creation and governance of 
the ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals and courts.14 This, in turn, has 
 
Reg. 2000/15, Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction Over 
Serious Criminal Offences, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter SPSC 
Statute]. The SPSC had jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
allegedly committed in East Timor in 1999, and operated within the District Court of Dili in East Timor 
until 2005. 
 8.  S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute] (establishing 
the STL). 
 9.  G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (May 22, 2003) (approving the establishment of 
the ECCC). The ECCC was subsequently established by way of agreement between the United Nations 
and Cambodia. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter ECCC Statute]. 
 10.  STL Statute, supra note 8, at art. 2. 
 11.  Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into 
force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (stating the parties are “[m]indful that during this 
century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity”). 
 12.  Id. (stating the parties “[a]ffirm that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by 
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,” and are 
“[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes”). 
 13.  Id. (stating the parties “[r]ecall that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”). 
 14.  The ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals and courts are either creations of the fifteen-
member UN Security Council acting pursuant to chapter VII of the UN Charter, see ICTR Statute, 
supra note 5; ICTY Statute, supra note 4; SPSC Statute, supra note 7, or institutions based upon 
agreements between the UN and the state in question, see ECCC Statute, supra note 9; STL Statute, 
supra note 8; SCSL Statute, supra note 6. For a synopsis of the decades-long process that culminated in 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l 
Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court [with an annex containing the resolutions adopted by the Conference], 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I) (July 17, 1998) (better known as the “Rome Conference”), which 
commenced in 1998 and was attended by representatives of 160 states, various intergovernmental 
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impacted the foundational documents of the ICC—the Rome Statue of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE)15—and the manner in which the ICC functions. 
In this article, we provide our perspective—as two practitioners who have 
each had the privilege of appearing for the defense in several cases before the 
ICC—on a few selected issues relevant to defense practice. In particular, we will 
endeavor to show how the nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction and its 
organizational structure impact the decision-making and practice of the defense 
in certain general respects. These encompass issues such as the allocation of 
limited personnel and material resources, the conduct of evidence review and 
investigations, and broader strategy. 
In commencing this discussion it is important to consider the impact of the 
above-mentioned foundational differences between the ICC and its ad hoc and 
hybrid brethren on the court as an institution. The first prosecutor of the ICC 
was not faced, upon election, with an immediate and clear imperative to 
commence large-scale and intensive investigations and prosecutions in any 
particular country. In this respect, the prosecutor was in a far more privileged 
position than the first prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR who faced the 
massive crime scenes of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. The 
judges and Registry also had time before having to confront real issues of 
concern to the defense.16 Whilst this gave the prosecutor and the other organs of 
the court time to prepare for the first case that would come before it, it seems 
that the luxury of time may have had an unintended but direct effect. The lack 
of cases before the court led to staff members having an abundance of time in 
which many theoretical discussions took place internally in and between the 
various organs of the court. Administrative structures and modalities were set 
up and promulgated, without any input from the practicing defense and without 
regard to the actual demands of court work. In the early days, it may not be too 
brutal to characterize the ICC as a think tank of a court divorced or unfamiliar 
with the realities of criminal investigations and courtroom litigation—at least 
from the defense perspective. In short, these discussions have contributed to 
internal policies being adopted that are sometimes unduly rigid, and excessively 
bureaucratic. It seems that only as the court gets busier will some of these 
 
entities and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, see WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 1–27 (2010). 
 15.  Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records, 
pt. II.A., ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, RPE], 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/ 
Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf (setting forth the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence). 
 16.  For example, the transfer of the first suspect into the ICC’s custody, Thomas Lubanga, 
occurred only on March 16, 2006. See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/ 
related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx 
(ICC website providing a summary of the case and linking to case documents). 
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impractical and inefficient policies be replaced by ones that are more sensitive 
to the real demands that the main court actors (judges, prosecution, legal 
representatives for the victims and the defense, including suspects and accused 
persons) actually encounter. 
Additionally, it is our view that the ICC prosecutor’s single but lengthy term 
of appointment17 has, arguably, made the court less dynamic and less capable of 
amending and revising procedures and practices once established. Such a long 
term for prosecutor hampers the ability of the Assembly of State Parties, which 
supervises the ICC, from actually pausing after a period and assessing whether 
the prosecutor of the ICC is discharging his or her responsibilities as 
anticipated, and in a manner that is fostering greater respect for the rule of law 
and accountability—or the converse. Much damage can be caused to the 
integrity and credibility of the Office of the Prosecutor—and therefore the ICC 
itself—in nine years. The risk of such a “rogue” or “inept” prosecutor would be 
somewhat mitigated by having the prosecutor elected for a shorter (but 
renewable) term. This risk is simply not present in the case of judges who are 
elected for a similar term. No one judge sets the law for the ICC. There are a 
minimum of three judges that make all decisions of great importance and there 
are at least eleven judges elected and serving at any one time, whereas there is 
only one person—the prosecutor—who sets the policy of his or her office. 
We offer our perspective on defense practices in six parts (the first being 
this introduction). In part II we detail the specific factors and tensions that 
inform defense practice at the ICC. As suggested above, from a 
macroperspective the work of the defense takes place within a system that has 
resulted from a particular confluence of historical, political, moral, legal, and 
administrative circumstances and influences. In part II we focus on defense 
practices from a more micro perspective. In this regard, the work of the defense 
is largely reactive in nature, in that it is the actions of other participants in the 
ICC criminal process—the prosecution, chambers, Registry, and States Parties 
to the Rome Statute—to which the defense must respond and that shape the 
manner in which the defense undertakes its work. 
In parts III, IV, and V we examine particular areas of the criminal process 
before the ICC, and activities related thereto, within which defense practices 
take place. In this article we will draw heavily upon our experiences to provide 
practical insight into defense practices before the ICC. 
In part III we explore the disclosure process between the prosecution and 
defense before the ICC, a particularly ripe area for discussion of defense 
practices given the centrality of disclosure in driving defense investigations and 
strategy throughout the preconfirmation and pretrial phases of a case. We 
submit that the manner and timing of prosecution disclosure, the legal regime 
 
 17.  The standard term for the prosecutor of the ICC is nine years, Rome Statue, supra note 11, at 
art. 42(4), which is more than double the (renewable) four year term applicable to the prosecutor of the 
ICTY and ICTR. 
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for disclosure at the ICC, and, to a lesser extent, the process of defense 
disclosure at the confirmation-of-charges stage, place a heavy burden on 
defense resources and unnecessarily hinder the defense’s ability to efficiently 
and effectively carry out its primary duty as the legal advocate of a suspect or 
accused person facing the most serious of criminal charges. 
In part IV we examine defense practices with respect to the confirmation-of-
charges process (a procedural stage unique to the ICC). In particular, we 
examine strategic considerations for the defense in view of the possible 
outcomes following a confirmation hearing. We highlight the potential risks and 
benefits arising from putting forth a robust and evidence-heavy defense at the 
confirmation stage as well as the uncertain legal position of suspects against 
whom judges have declined to confirm any charges. 
In part V we explore the conduct of defense investigations before the ICC, 
namely, the impact on defense investigative practices flowing from (1) the 
reality of the ICC as an institution exercising global criminal jurisdiction (which 
necessarily limits the expertise and resources allocable to any particular 
situation), (2) the basis of the court’s jurisdiction (which impacts the 
prosecution’s approach to investigations, and state cooperation with the court), 
and (3) the process of disclosure at the ICC (which is examined in detail in part 
III). 
In part VI we conclude the article with a summary of key findings from parts 
III through V and provide further analysis of defense practices within these 
three areas from the perspective of practice theory. 
II 
DEFENSE PRACTICES 
In this article we examine the work of the defense before the ICC through 
the lens of practice theory. Practice theorists seek to describe and provide 
understanding of “social and human phenomena”18 by identifying and analyzing 
the “bundles of [recurrent] practices”19 that underlie such phenomena. Practice 
theorists assert that the actions of individual actors “take place and are 
intelligible only as part of an ongoing practice and against the ‘more or less 
stable background of other practices,’”20 but recognize that “[p]ractices are . . . 
always necessarily open to contestation and this keeps them continuously in a 
state of tension and change.”21 
Defense teams practicing before the ICC are small ad hoc entities, not 
permanent institutions like the four organs of the court.22 Nonetheless, the 
 
 18.  DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK, AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 6 
(2013). 
 19.  Id. at 2. 
 20.  Id. at 5 (citation omitted). 
 21.  Id. at 6. 
 22.  These are the Presidency, chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. Rome 
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utility of practice theory is not limited to larger organizations.23 Practice theory 
can therefore serve as a valuable tool for identifying common issues facing the 
defense at the ICC and understanding the wider context within which ICC 
defense counsel operate. This in turn provides insight into the decision-making 
and actions of defense counsel in carrying out their core duties of providing 
effective representation to the client. Additionally, and as recognized above, the 
actions of individual defense counsel in deciding upon a particular course of 
action can influence how future counsel (as well as the organs of the court) will 
make decisions and act with respect to similar issues. Such practical 
“precedents” are perhaps of greater significance at the ICC, which is still a 
relatively young institution with a very wide mandate. 
On an average day, the work of a defense team practicing before the ICC at 
the preconfirmation or pretrial stage of a case may involve, for example, the 
following: consultation with the client on case strategy, evidence analysis, or 
team administration matters; receipt, organization, and analysis of prosecution 
disclosure; drafting of a motion seeking particular relief or responding to a 
motion from another party or participant; drafting of legal memoranda on 
procedural or substantive-law issues; communications with the prosecution 
seeking disclosure of information or items relevant to the defense’s preparation; 
communications with the court’s Registry on legal aid, third-party cooperation, 
or witness protection matters; interviewing a potential witness in person or over 
the phone; and interteam discussion and decision-making on investigative and 
legal strategy and work distribution. The lead defense counsel, whom the client 
has retained to represent him or her before the ICC, may be directly involved in 
these activities, or lead counsel may oversee and provide appropriate 
instruction to other members of the defense team in conducting these activities. 
During the confirmation hearing and trial proceedings, the defense will also 
engage in activities such as preparing and conducting cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses, examining defense witnesses, and making submissions on 
the admissibility and probative value of items of proposed evidence. 
The above-described activities underlie the wider “phenomena” (to use the 
language of practice theory) of particular defense practices. As set out in part I, 
in this article we focus on three such phenomena: (1) defense approaches to 
prosecution disclosure at the ICC, (2) strategic considerations for the defense at 
the confirmation-of-charges stage, and (3) defense investigations. In each of 
these three areas, outside factors play a significant role in determining how the 
“bundles of practices”24 underlying these phenomena take place. 
For example, when receiving disclosure from the prosecution, a defense 
team must conduct a preliminary review of and then organize the items received 
 
Statute, supra note 11, at art. 34. 
 23.  See NICOLINI, supra note 18, at 4 (analyzing a single “class” in a school—composed of, among 
other things, a teacher and students—through practice theory). 
 24.  NICOLINI, supra note 18, at 2. 
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in a manner that allows for the proper analysis of each item vis-à-vis other items 
and relevant information (such as which witnesses may have knowledge of the 
item) as well as with respect to where the item of evidence fits within the 
prosecution’s theory of the case. The defense must then analyze in-depth the 
content and value of each disclosed item. Following this, the pertinent 
information extracted from each item of evidence must be incorporated into the 
defense’s wider analysis of the prosecution’s case theory as well as into the 
defense investigation plan.25 As will be examined below, the manner in which 
the defense undertakes these practices when approaching the issue of 
prosecution disclosure is shaped and impacted by the following factors, among 
others: the timing of prosecution disclosure including of the prosecution’s core 
charging document, the Document Containing the Charges (DCC); the scope of 
any redactions applied to an item, including to the identity of a witness; the 
gradual disclosure of less-redacted versions of an item; and the legal parameters 
of the disclosure regime itself, as set out in the Rome Statute, RPE,26 and ICC 
jurisprudence. 
The practices underlying the other two phenomena examined in this article 
are similarly shaped by factors outside the defense’s control. With respect to the 
issue of strategic considerations for the defense at confirmation (examined in 
part IV), article 61(7) and (8) of the Rome Statute sets out the legal outcomes 
that the defense may face following a pre-trial chamber’s decision on the 
confirmation-of-charges hearing.27 However, each future defense counsel will 
need to take into account the record of the outcomes of actual confirmation 
hearings and, if applicable, subsequent trial proceedings when considering the 
appropriate case strategy for his or her client at the confirmation stage. 
The practices underlying defense investigations (examined in part V)—such 
as the creation of an investigation plan, conducting investigations in the field, 
and seeking the assistance of states—are shaped and impacted by the context in 
which these investigations take place (the state of the locus in quo of the alleged 
crime and the type of jurisdiction exercised under article 13 of the Rome 
Statute) as well as by the issue addressed in part III, the disclosure regime at the 
ICC. 
By examining these three areas of defense phenomena before the ICC 
through the lens of practice theory, as well as from the perspective of 
practitioners at the ICC, we aim to provide a greater understanding of the day-
to-day functioning of the defense before the ICC as shaped by both external 
factors and the decision-making of individual defense counsel. 
 
 25.  Naturally, the processes discussed—organization, analysis and incorporation—are not 
separated by strict boundaries and each may involve, to varying degrees, aspects of the other processes. 
 26.  Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 15. 
 27.  Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
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III 
THE PRACTICE OF INTER PARTES DISCLOSURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
Article 67(1)(b) of the Rome Statute guarantees a suspect or accused person 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defense.28 Article 
67(1)(a) requires that a suspect or accused must “be informed promptly and in 
detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge[s]” against him or her.29 
Unfortunately, the practice that has developed at the ICC with respect to the 
manner and timing of prosecution disclosure to the defense at the confirmation 
and trial stages has undercut these fundamental rights, led to delays in 
proceedings, and caused unnecessary resource expenditure on the side of the 
defense. 
This practice of prosecution disclosure additionally exacerbates the already 
heavy burden placed on the defense, with its comparatively limited resources, in 
having to comply with the requirements of the “E-court Protocol”30 applicable 
in each case to inter partes disclosure and the provision of evidence to the ICC 
Registry. 
A. Disclosure Practices and Their Impact on the Functioning of the Defense 
With respect to the practice of the Office of the Prosecutor’s disclosure to 
the defense, this unfortunate state of affairs at the ICC has arisen for primarily 
three reasons: (1) late disclosure; (2) a regime for the protection of identifying 
information related to witnesses, potential witnesses, victims and “others at risk 
on account of the activities of the Court”31 that is overly broad, does not 
properly distinguish between the general public on the one hand and the 
suspect or accused on the other, and, at least at the confirmation stage, allows 
the prosecutor to submit and rely on anonymous summaries of witness evidence 
that may be significantly lacking in substance, coherence, or both; and (3) a 
cumbersome, lengthy, and resource-intensive process for the imposition and 
lifting of redactions. 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See, for example, the e-court protocol applicable at the confirmation stage in Prosecutor v. 
Kenyatta (Kenya II). Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence 
Disclosure and Other Related Matters, ¶ 18-20 (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1052098.pdf. The version of the e-court protocol applicable at the confirmation stage in 
Kenya II is included as an annex to the above-cited decision. Int’l Criminal Court, Registry, Unified 
Technical Protocol (“E-court Protocol”) for the Provision of Evidence, witness and victims information 
in electronic form, ICC Doc. ICC-01/09-02/11-48-Anx1 (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1052099.pdf. 
 31.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for 
Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements,” ¶ 54 (May 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc492175.pdf. 
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1. Late Prosecution Disclosure 
At the first modern international criminal tribunal, the ICTY, the 
prosecution provides the disclosure it relied upon to obtain the indictment 
against the accused to the defense at or shortly after the initial appearance of 
the accused.32 At the ICC this does not occur. Instead, a “final” deadline for 
prosecution disclosure at the confirmation stage is set at thirty days prior to the 
start of the confirmation hearing,33 with the general disclosure process and other 
timelines at the confirmation and trial stages governed by decisions of the pre-
trial and trial chambers. 
The ICC prosecution’s approach has been to view this thirty-day “final” 
deadline for disclosure of its evidence, its DCC, and its list of evidence as a 
standard and permissible deadline for disclosure of core items of evidence and 
specific allegations against the suspect, with this mentality then carrying over to 
the disclosure process at the trial stage. 
The practice in the case of Prosecutor v. Abu Garda is emblematic of this 
approach. The initial appearance of Mr. Abu Garda was held on May 18, 2009.34 
The defense did not receive a single item of disclosure from the prosecution 
until more than three months later, on August 24, 2009.35 The confirmation 
hearing began on October 19, 2009,36 with final substantive prosecution 
disclosure taking place on September 14, 2009, a few days prior to the thirty-day 
deadline.37 This final disclosure included revised versions of summaries38 of 
interview transcripts of six prosecution witnesses, core evidence in the case.39 
The DCC was disclosed only four days prior to this.40 
 
 32.  Rule 66 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence mandates that the prosecutor shall 
make available to the defense “within thirty days of the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the 
supporting material which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well as all 
prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused.” Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 2d Sess., Jan. 17–Feb. 11, 1994, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY Doc. IT/32/Rev. 49 
(May 22, 2013) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, RPE] (first adopted on 
Feb. 11, 1994), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/ 
IT032Rev49_en.pdf. 
 33.  Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 15, at r. 121(3). 
 34.  Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 5 (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf. 
 35.  Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Prosecution’s Communication of Potentially 
Exonerating Evidence Disclosed to the Defence on 24 August 2009 (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://www.iccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc731916.pdf. 
 36.  Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 13 (Feb. 8, 
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf. 
 37.  Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Prosecution’s Communication of Incriminating 
Evidence Disclosed to the Defence on 14 and 17 September 2009 (Sep. 18, 2009), 
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/do c745350.pdf. 
 38.  Pursuant to article 61(5) of the Rome Statute, the prosecution may rely upon summary 
evidence at the confirmation-of-charges hearing. Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
 39.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 40.  See Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Public Redacted Version of Prosecution’s 
“Document Containing the Charges Submitted Pursuant to Article 61(3) of the Statute” filed on 10 
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The defense is required to file its list of evidence fifteen days prior to the 
start of the confirmation hearing pursuant to rule 121(6) of the RPE,41 so the 
three-person legal aid–funded defense team (including the authors) was left 
with effectively one and a half months to review, organize, and analyze 
thousands of pages of prosecution disclosure, consult with the client, and 
conduct defense investigations in circumstances where the defense was barred 
from entering the state (Sudan) where the three war crimes charges alleged 
were said to have occurred.42 
The following year, in the case of Prosecutor v. Banda, which involves the 
same factual matrix as the Abu Garda case, the single judge warned that he did 
not want a recurrence of the situation in the Abu Garda case, where core 
substantive disclosure to the defense—including the DCC—had occurred “so 
close to the 30 days’ deadline.”43 
Although tardy disclosure at the confirmation stage was not a significant 
issue in the Banda case given that the evidence being disclosed was substantially 
the same as that in the Abu Garda case, delayed disclosure continues to be 
standard operating procedure for the prosecution, to the detriment of the 
defense and the fundamental rights of suspects and accused persons. In 
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta (Kenya II), the defense of Ambassador Muthaura placed 
the prosecution and pre-trial chamber on notice more than five months prior to 
the start of the confirmation hearing regarding the concerns of the defense as to 
the prosecution’s approach to disclosure.44 At a status conference held on April 
18, 2011, the Muthaura defense submitted as follows: 
[The thirty-day final deadline for disclosure] is not a licence for the Prosecution to ride 
rough shod over the Defense Article 67 rights . . . . [T]imely disclosure will depend 
upon the facts of the case, and it must always be seen through the prism of making the 
confirmation hearing effective and meaningful. . . .  
 [T]he position of the Muthaura team is that your Honours must look at the case in 
hand, the complexity of case, the nature of the allegations and the types of evidence 
that the Prosecution wish to rely upon. And you cannot be hamstrung or handcuffed 
to a rigid rule that, in all cases, 30 days before the [confirmation] hearing is consistent 
with the obligations or consistent with the rights of the suspect to have adequate time 
and facilities and also a reasonable time before the hearing to get all the evidence.
 45
 
Despite this, exactly at the thirty-day deadline, the prosecution disclosed to 
the defense its DCC, a more than 6600 page “in-depth analysis chart,” 
 
September 2009 (Sep. 24, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc746719.pdf. 
 41.  Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 15. 
 42.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 43.  Prosecutor v. Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Transcript of Status Conference, 14 (June 23, 
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc899239.pdf. 
 44.  The confirmation-of-charges hearing in the Kenya II case commenced on September 21, 2011. 
Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 16 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314543.pdf. 
 45.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Transcript of Status Conference, 12:22–13:2, 18:14–20 
(April 18, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1060257.pdf. 
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purportedly meant to assist the defense and judges in understanding the 
evidentiary basis of the prosecution’s case, and an additional 1300 pages of 
incriminatory disclosure, including more than 1200 pages of transcripts of 
witness interviews.46 Thus, in addition to continuing its ongoing investigations 
based on the article 58 summons decision and previous prosecution disclosure 
in the case, the defense now had fifteen days to analyze the DCC and the 6600-
page analysis chart, review hundreds of pages of new interview transcripts of a 
key prosecution witness, and, after this, undertake new or adapt ongoing 
investigations in Kenya based on these late disclosures. 
The defense of Ambassador Muthaura, for example, within this fifteen-day 
period, and after undertaking the above-mentioned review, was able to arrange 
and conduct interviews with fifteen new witnesses, including eight within a 
twenty-four hour period,47 and take signed statements from all of these 
individuals. Although the defense could undertake these investigations by 
working on a round-the-clock basis with senior attorneys moving from one 
interview to the next and junior members of the team immediately turning to 
the task of obtaining signed statements from witnesses, this hardly undermines 
or weakens the complaint that the defense did not have “adequate time” for its 
preparation. Moreover, the defense team of Ambassador Muthaura was funded 
from outside the legal-aid system and had more resources available to it 
(particularly with respect to manpower) than the average legal aid–funded 
defense team, such as that of Mr. Abu Garda. 
This pattern of significantly delayed disclosure continues at the trial stage. 
At a status conference in the Kenya II case held on February 14, 2013, two 
months prior to the scheduled trial commencement date of April 11, 2013, the 
defense of both accused persons were adamant that the trial date must be 
vacated in view of the present state of disclosure and the fair-trial rights of the 
accused persons.48 The Defense of Ambassador Muthaura submitted that 
the disclosure system in this case is not fit for purpose. It is not working. . . . [W]e get a 
situation today where a fair trial is impossible in April not because of anything we 
have done, but because of the massive violations in the OTP. Your Honours, the 
reason I wished the Prosecution in all honesty to be invited to address the Bench as to 
the viability of the commencement date is because in other cases, for example in the 
Banda and Jerbo case, and your learned brother in this trial sits in that case also, the 
Prosecutor at the end Mr. Sachdeva sits in that case, the Prosecution with a straight 
face said that they would complete their disclosure in March and the Defense should 
be expected to be ready for trial in March. There is a pattern of conduct that besets 
 
 46.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution’s Document Containing the Charges, List of 
Evidence and Comprehensive In-Depth Analysis Chart of Evidence Included in the List of Evidence 
Submitted Pursuant to Article 61(3) and Rule 121(3) (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1207444.pdf. The number of pages referenced is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 47.  See Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Muthaura Defense Notice of Withdrawal of Its 
Request for Adjournment of the Confirmation Hearing (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1227231.pdf. 
 48.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Transcript of Status Conference, 18:23–25, 25:18–25 (Feb. 
14, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1552621.pdf. 
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this Court in my submission where the Prosecution are not taking their disclosure 
obligations seriously. . . . We are asking this Court to suspend the principle of 
expediency and the right of expedition to enable us to have adequate time to prepare 
our defense under Article 67, as well as to have proper disclosure during that period 
so that we may prepare for trial.
49
 
The defense of Mr. Kenyatta provided the following details regarding the 
amount of evidence the prosecution intended to rely upon at trial that was 
attributable to witnesses whose identities remained redacted from the defense, 
materials that had been disclosed only recently to the defense, or both: 
The next point that I have concerns the number of witnesses whose identity has not 
been revealed to date . . . it’s not again just the fact - the very important fact - of the 
name. It’s the extent of the percentage of evidence that is related to the number of 
witnesses that are either unknown to the Defense or for example evidence which has 
been collected post-confirmation and served within the last few months. An initial 
calculation of the amount of evidence that the Prosecution seeks to rely on that was 
collated post-confirmation is 84 per cent.
50
 
On March 7, 2013, Trial Chamber V of the court vacated the April 11th trial 
date, provisionally rescheduling the commencement of trial for July 9, 2013, on 
the basis of, inter alia, “the defense submissions relating to the impact of 
delayed disclosure, which the Chamber must resolve.”51 
As alluded to in the above submissions of the Kenyatta team, the timing and 
continuation of prosecution investigations after the issuance of a summons to 
appear or arrest warrant, or the occurrence of the confirmation-of-charges 
hearing, is a major factor in the prosecution’s practice of disclosing a significant 
amount of substantive material on the eve of, if not the day of, the final 
deadline for such disclosure. For example, in the case of Prosecutor v. Abu 
Garda, where the confirmation-of-charges hearing began on October 19, 2009, 
more than one-third of the witness statements relied upon by the prosecution 
were obtained as late as July and August of that year.52 However, with respect 
to the slightly less than one-third of the relied-upon statements that were 
obtained in 2008, it is unclear why at least these materials could not have been 
disclosed shortly after the May 2009 initial appearance of Mr. Abu Garda. 
Needless to say, given the consistent practice of dilatory prosecution 
disclosure at the ICC, the defense must be vigilant regarding and devote 
significant resources toward the litigation of disclosure-related issues to protect 
the fundamental fair-trial rights of their clients. The defense should likewise 
expect to receive critical and substantial amounts of disclosure very close to the 
start of the confirmation hearing or the commencement of trial, including the 
prosecution’s core charging document, and therefore make all possible efforts 
to organize, assess, and act upon this information once received within a limited 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 29:1–10. 
 51.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Order Concerning the Start Date of Trial, ¶ 10 (Mar. 7, 
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1564494.pdf. 
 52.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
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timeframe. 
2. The Protection Regime of the ICC and the Manner of Prosecution 
Disclosure 
Late prosecution disclosure is only one aspect of a troubled ICC disclosure 
regime. Once the defense receives prosecution disclosure it must of course be 
able to effectively analyze and utilize such disclosure for the purposes of 
investigations and preparations for the defense case. 
Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute permits the prosecutor, at the 
confirmation-of-charges hearing, to rely on anonymous or summarised versions 
of witness interviews as opposed to interview transcripts, signed statements, or 
oral testimony.53 However, as occurred in the Kenya II case, when such an 
anonymous summary consists of three-quarters of one page,54 there is hardly 
any meat for the defense to sink its investigative teeth into. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, when the prosecution discloses 
hundreds of pages of transcripts of witness interviews that meander from topic 
to topic and feature unclear or contradictory timelines and answers, the defense 
is hard-pressed and must expend significant resources to decipher, organize, 
and understand a coherent prosecution narrative upon which to base its 
investigations. As addressed above, late disclosure further exacerbates this 
problem. 
In a February 17, 2012 judgment in the Banda case,55 the appeals chamber 
held that the prosecution cannot be required, pursuant to rule 112 of the RPE, 
to produce organized and signed statements of a witness’s interview.56 Rule 112 
mandates that, pursuant to article 55(2) of the Rome Statute, interviews of 
persons whom the prosecution has grounds to believe committed a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the court (including, for example, a low-level direct 
perpetrator or a mid-level coperpetrator), must be audio or video recorded.57 
The transcripts produced from these recordings result in the aforementioned 
hundreds of pages of meandering narrative. 
However, once the prosecution has actually made a decision as to which 
witnesses it shall rely upon for the purposes of the confirmation hearing and 
certainly for trial, there is, arguably, nothing preventing it from producing 
organized statements based on the interview transcripts that a witness can 
review and if necessary correct before signing—as is the normal course of 
 
 53.  Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
 54.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge of a summary of the evidence of the 
individual designated as prosecution Witness 1. 
 55.  Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber IV of 12 September 2011 Entitled “Reasons for the Order on Translation of Witness 
Statements (ICC-02/05-03/09-199) and Additional Instructions on Translation,” (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1335042.pdf. 
 56.  Id. at ¶¶ 26-28. 
 57.  Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 15. 
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events at most international tribunals—especially where the defense does not 
object to such an exercise being undertaken. Such a statement could be 
disclosed along with the transcripts of the interview, and would be in the 
interests of justice and certainly of great assistance to the defense in attempting 
to efficiently understand the prosecution’s case.58 
 The scope of protective measures—in particular redactions—applied at 
the ICC is an additional cause of concern for the defense. At the very least it is 
one where defense counsel needs to be ever vigilant. At the ad hoc and hybrid 
international courts and tribunals, protective measures including redactions are 
primarily applied to the identity of witnesses and their families, with the 
anonymity of particularly at-risk witnesses lifted a certain number of months or 
weeks prior to the start of trial or the witness’s testimony.59 The ICC likewise 
follows such an approach with respect to prosecution witnesses.60 
However, as established by the ICC appeals chamber in a May 13, 2008 
judgment in the Prosecutor v. Katanga case,61 the relevant provisions of the 
Rome Statute62 and RPE,63 when read together64 oblige the prosecution, 
Registry, and chambers to assess the situation and provide for the protection of 
an additional and broad category of individuals: “others at risk on account of 
the activities of the Court.”65 
This is, of course, an admirable goal and decision of the appeals chamber. 
However, the implementation of this responsibility has resulted in a sweeping 
and resource-intensive redaction regime that is highly prejudicial to the ability 
of the defense to analyze prosecution disclosure and conduct investigations. 
For example, in the case of Prosecutor v. Banda, many of the very same 
redactions that had, in the Abu Garda case, been instituted, for the most part, 
only after approval by the pre-trial chamber (whether proposed by the 
prosecution through the application process, or applied propio motu by the pre-
trial chamber), were approved for the current case and continued to apply at 
 
 58.  The trial chamber arguably has the power to order the taking of such statements pursuant to 
its article 64(2) obligation to “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full 
respect for the rights of the accused.” Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
 59.  See, for example, Rule 69 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Int’l Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, RPE, supra note 32. 
 60.  Rome Statue, supra note 11, at art. 64(3)(c); Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 15, at r. 76. 
 61.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor 
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for 
Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements,” ¶ 54 (May 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc492175.pdf. 
 62.  Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
 63.  Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 15. 
 64.  Rome Statue, supra note 11, at arts. 43(6), 68(4) & 54(3)(f); Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra 
note 15, at rs. 76(4), 81(4) & 87(1). 
 65.  Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation 
to Redact Witness Statements,” ¶ 54 (May 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc492175.pdf. 
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the trial stage.66 This resulted in redactions that make the redacted documents 
difficult to comprehend.67 For example, the names of individuals with whom a 
prosecution witness had happened to be visiting several years prior to, and in a 
wholly different part of Darfur than the African Union base that forms the 
subject of the case, were redacted.68 The names of two high-ranking officials 
from an international organization who had briefly met with a prosecution 
witness in Darfur were also redacted.69 Another individual in a witness’s 
statement was simply identified by name (which was redacted from the defense) 
and described as a guest who was visiting from a particular European country.70 
In these circumstances, for the prosecution to submit or for a chamber to 
find that the appeals chamber’s requirement of an “objectively justifiable risk” 
to the individual in question “aris[ing] from disclosing the particular 
information to the Defence”71 has been fulfilled is worrying. And these are not 
isolated examples. 
Even more troubling are the redactions applied to individuals who are not 
prosecution witnesses or potential prosecution witnesses, but who are 
undoubtedly “potential witnesses” in the broader sense of the word. In the 
Banda case, redactions applied to the names and other identifying information 
of certain individuals who were present inside the African Union base in the 
months and days leading up to the attack on the base, and who therefore are 
persons whom the defense would wish to locate and speak to, were lifted more 
than two years after the prosecution completed the bulk of its disclosure to the 
defense, and only after months of defense-driven litigation seeking the lifting of 
these redactions.72 
The withholding of such information from the defense for such a long period 
is especially concerning in a case in which the defense cannot even enter the 
state in which the crimes alleged are said to have occurred. The proportionality 
test established by the appeals chamber for considering the appropriateness of 
imposing or continuing to impose redactions at the ICC requires a pre-trial or 
trial chamber to evaluate whether the redactions requested are “prejudicial to 
 
 66.  Regulation 42 of the Regulations of the Court mandates that protective measures imposed in 
one case “continue to have full force and effect in relation to any other proceedings before the 
Court . . . subject to revision by a Chamber.” Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., 
May 17–28, 2004, Regulations of the Court, ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations 
_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf. 
 67.  This conclusion is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 68.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 69.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 70.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 71.  Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation 
to Redact Witness Statements,” ¶ 71 (May 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc492175.pdf. 
 72.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
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or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”73 
These redactions have been prejudicial to the fair-trial rights of the accused in 
view of the significant time and investigatory opportunities lost as a result of the 
delayed lifting of these redactions. 
Apart from the individuals covered by these redactions, the manner in 
which redactions are applied, even at the trial stage, may render the disclosed 
material of limited value to the defense. Lead counsel for Mr. Kenyatta in the 
Kenya II case recently expressed the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
analyze disclosed materials and conduct investigations thereon, when the item 
in question is so heavily redacted: 
I’ve done many cases in my career whereby I have put up with levels of redaction, or 
late information, and the trial goes on and I know I’ll be able to deal with it later on, 
but in this exceptional case which has great importance in relation to the nature of the 
evidence being alleged, I am advising the Court that I am not in a position now 
because I have not even been able to read the detailed evidence that [Prosecution 
counsel] Mr Manoj has said “Ah, because that could identify him or others, we can’t 
express who was at the meeting, we have to redact that because that might reveal who 
it was.” Well, I have news for the Prosecutor. That’s what a criminal case is about. 
That’s what we are entitled to do, and by their [the Prosecution’s] own admission they 
are failing to put us in that position.
74
 
Faced with such a heavy regime of protective measures, the defense must 
adapt accordingly. As mentioned above, the defense must be vigilant and 
proactive on disclosure issues, including challenging requests for the imposition 
of redactions and seeking the review and lifting of redactions when imposed. 
Admittedly, the task is a difficult one given that the defense must work from 
versions of the prosecution’s applications requesting redactions and the court’s 
decisions thereon that are themselves heavily redacted. Where feasible, and as 
discussed in the next part, the defense should also consider the logging of 
redactions as they are lifted so as to ensure that critical information is not 
overlooked as the disclosure and investigation process proceeds. 
There is also a more fundamental danger with what has become a regime of 
almost reflexive imposition of redactions at the ICC—namely, that the process 
of application for, judicial review of, and imposition of redactions has become 
so unwieldy and unmanageable that outright miscarriages of justice may occur. 
As detailed below, the circumstances in the Kenya II case surrounding the 
failure of the prosecution, at the preconfirmation stage, to disclose an item of 
critical exonerating value related to a core prosecution witness—“Witness 4”—
is a case in point. 
 
 
 73.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “First Decision on the 
Prosecution Requests and Amended Requests for Redactions under Rule 81,” ¶ 34 (Dec. 14, 2006), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243667.pdf. 
 74.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Transcript of Status Conference, 25:4–12 (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1552621.pdf. 
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The defense of both accused persons in the Kenya II case filed applications 
with the trial chamber in February 2013 seeking, inter alia, the referral of the 
case back to the pre-trial chamber or an available judge of the pre-trial division 
to determine whether the confirmation process was fatally flawed due to, 
among other things, the above-mentioned nondisclosure.75 In its consolidated 
response to these filings, the prosecution “acknowledge[d] and regret[ed] its 
error in not disclosing Witness 4’s asylum affidavit prior to confirmation.”76 
As a reading of the defense applications and the prosecution’s response 
reveal, the written statements of Witness 4 were put forward by the prosecution, 
and relied upon by the pre-trial chamber, to establish, to the requisite standard 
of proof, the alleged existence and content of two meetings at which the 
supposed common plan in the case was said to have been formulated and 
implemented.77 As submitted by the defense of Ambassador Muthaura, 
The [pre-trial chamber] relied principally on the evidence of Witness 4 to establish 
these meetings. Indeed, the Majority stated at paragraphs 311 and 342 respectively of 
the Confirmation Decision that “the occurrence of this meeting is established to the 
requisite threshold by the testimony of Witness OTP-4 who was present as a Mungiki 
representative and who provides a detailed account thereof”. . . . It is clear, on any fair 
reading of the evidence or the Confirmation Decision, that without the evidence of 
Witness 4, there would not have been any sufficient basis to find the existence of a 
common plan to commit the crimes alleged in Nakuru and Naivasha, or accordingly, to 
confirm the case against Ambassador Muthaura.
78
 
In the aforementioned asylum affidavit, Witness 4 contradicts his statements 
to the prosecution that he attended one of the key meetings in question and 
provides information demonstrating that he could not have been present at the 
other meeting.79 In short, and even as the prosecution admitted with respect to 
 
 75.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Application 
Pursuant to Article 64(4) for an Order to Refer Back to Pre-Trial Chamber II or a Judge of the Pre-
Trial Division the Preliminary Issue of the Validity of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges or 
for an Order Striking Out New Facts Alleged in the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief and Request for an 
Extension of the Page Limit Pursuant to Regulation 37(2)” (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1549410.pdf; Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Defence Application to the Trial 
Chamber Pursuant to Article 64(4) of the Rome Statute to Refer the Preliminary Issue of the 
Confirmation Decision to the Pre-Trial Chamber for Reconsideration (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1548545.pdf. 
 76.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 
Consolidated Prosecution Response to the Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statue to 
Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ¶ 31 (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1557330.pdf. 
 77.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 78.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Application 
Pursuant to Article 64(4) for an Order to Refer Back to Pre-Trial Chamber II or a Judge of the Pre-
Trial Division the Preliminary Issue of the Validity of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges or 
for an Order Striking Out New Facts Alleged in the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief and Request for an 
Extension of the Page Limit Pursuant to Regulation 37(2),” ¶ 14 (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1549410.pdf (internal citations omitted). 
 79.  Id. ¶ 16. 
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Ambassador Muthaura,80 
Witness 4 was the principal source of evidence that supported the Prosecution’s 
charges against Mr Muthaura at the confirmation stage. . . . [T]here would not have 
been sufficient evidence to confirm the charges against Mr Muthaura without Witness 
4’s evidence. . . . [T]he Prosecution’s disclosure error could conceivably have affected 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to commit Mr Muthaura to trial. In sum, Mr 
Muthaura presents the extremely rare case where it is appropriate to contemplate 
sending the case back to the Pre-Trial Chamber for reconsideration on the basis of the 
withheld Affidavit, and to consider the impact that the inconsistent statement might 
have on the confirmation decision.
81
 
Accordingly, charges against at least one individual who appeared as suspect 
before the ICC were very likely wrongly confirmed for trial, resulting in 
concomitant stress and mental anguish to the individual and his family, damage 
to the individual’s reputation, and the unnecessary expense of time and 
resources by the court, prosecution, and non–legal aid–funded defense. This 
injustice was only rectified on March 11, 2013, more than a year after the 
issuance of the confirmation decision in this case,82 when the prosecutor notified 
the trial chamber of her intention to withdraw all charges against Ambassador 
Muthaura.83 The trial chamber subsequently authorized the termination of 
proceedings against Ambassador Muthaura on March 18, 2013.84 
Of course, of particular interest in the context of this article is the genesis of 
this cascading set of events—that is, the nondisclosure of Witness 4’s asylum 
affidavit. As the defense submitted, the affidavit had been obtained by the 
prosecution more than one year prior to the confirmation-of-charges hearing in 
 
 80.  With respect to Mr. Kenyatta, the prosecution submitted that 
[s]ending the confirmation decision back to the Pre-Trial Chamber for reconsideration would 
serve no purpose . . . . Assuming new confirmation proceedings were ordered, the evidence 
cited in the Prosecution [Pre-Trial Brief] and list of evidence would comfortably surpass the 
‘substantial grounds’ threshold required to send a case to trial. 
Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 Consolidated 
Prosecution Response to the Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statue to Refer the 
Confirmation Decision Back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ¶ 42 (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1557330.pdf. The defense of Mr. Kenyatta, not surprisingly, disputes the prosecution’s 
position. See Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of the Defence Reply to the 
“Confidential Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 Consolidated Prosecution Response to the 
Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statute to Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber” (March 8, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1565223.pdf. 
 81.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 
Consolidated Prosecution Response to the Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statue to 
Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ¶ 44 (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1565223.pdf. 
 82.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314543.pdf. 
 83.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges 
Against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, ¶ 1 (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1565549.pdf. 
 84.  Prosecutor v. Muthaura & Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal 
of Charges Against Mr Muthaura (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1568411.pdf. 
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the case, but was disclosed only a year after the confirmation decision.85 The 
prosecution provided the following explanations as to why it had applied to the 
single judge of the pre-trial chamber to withhold in full the affidavit from the 
defense—as opposed to redacting or summarizing the affidavit—and the 
propriety of this application: 
With the benefit of hindsight, the affidavit could and should have been disclosed to the 
Defence prior to the confirmation hearing, with redactions to information that could 
have revealed Witness 4’s place of residence. The Prosecution acknowledges that the 
reasoning contained in its redactions application was insufficient in light of the 
potential significance of [the exculpatory information] and provided the Single Judge 
with inadequate information. The reality is, however, that a review of the relevant 
records demonstrates that the potential significance of [the exculpatory information] 
was not discovered until after the confirmation hearing . . . . 
The Prosecution’s [] records reveal that the affidavit was reviewed for relevance and 
disclosure by at least two Prosecution staff prior to the confirmation hearing. . . . The 
significance of the other sentence at issue – Witness 4’s statement that someone told 
him about the Nairobi Club meeting – was not recognized. One must be familiar with 
Witness 4’s statements that he attended the Nairobi Club meeting to spot the apparent 
inconsistency, and through an oversight, the inconsistency was not identified during 
the disclosure review.
86
 
The defense of both accused persons challenged the above narrative that the 
prosecution put forth. For example, the Muthaura defense detailed the 
numerous opportunities various senior members of the prosecution, including 
those who interviewed the witness and took receipt of the affidavit, would have 
had to rectify the nondisclosure, and the fact that it was the defense that had to 
bring this most serious issue to the attention of the prosecutor and then the trial 
chamber.87 
Even if one were to accept, as the prosecution submits, that what occurred 
with respect to Witness 4’s asylum affidavit was mere “error” or “oversight,” 
leaving disclosure review of documents pertaining to a key witness to a “junior 
‘reviewer’”88 who, according to the prosecution, was not familiar with the core 
evidence of the witness, speaks to a systemic failure in the Office of the 
 
 85.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Application 
Pursuant to Article 64(4) for an Order to Refer Back to Pre-Trial Chamber II or a Judge of the Pre-
Trial Division the Preliminary Issue of the Validity of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges or 
for an Order Striking Out New Facts Alleged in the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief and Request for an 
Extension of the Page Limit Pursuant to Regulation 37(2),” ¶ 17 (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc 1549410.pdf. 
 86.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 
Consolidated Prosecution Response to the Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statue to 
Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ¶ 37–38 (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1557330.pdf. 
 87.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Reply to 
Confidential Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 Consolidated Prosecution Response to the 
Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statue to Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber”, Submitted on 7 March 2013, ¶ 7–19 (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1565107.pdf. 
 88.  Id. ¶ 3. 
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Prosecutor.89 This error was compounded by the incorrect decision of the 
prosecution to represent to the single judge that a redacted or summarized 
version of the affidavit would have rendered it useless for the purposes of the 
defense.90 Although it is the judges who are ultimately responsible for 
authorizing the nondisclosure of information, as noted by the Muthaura defense 
in this circumstance, “the order of the Single Judge granting the OTP’s 
application . . . was clearly predicated on her expectation that ‘the Prosecutor 
had carefully reviewed the evidence in his possession . . . both incriminatory and 
exculpatory.’”91 
The above-mentioned reflexive, if not cavalier, attitude toward redactions 
by the ICC prosecution, and the wide scope and imposition of redactions at the 
ICC—beyond merely witnesses and their families—has resulted in a 
bureaucratic, overbroad, and resource-draining redaction regime. At its worst, 
such a regime risks resulting in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and 
otherwise greatly hinders the work of the defense. 
The defense, therefore, in addition to challenging applications for and 
continued imposition of redactions, should be prepared to carefully examine the 
reasoning behind redactions once they are lifted, seek the underlying 
applications requesting and decisions granting nondisclosure when these are not 
made immediately available,92 and decide whether action need be taken based 
 
 89.  Regarding the prosecution’s actions with respect to the evidence of Witness 4, Judge Christine 
Van den Wyngaert commented in a concurring opinion, 
[T]here can be no excuse for the Prosecution’s negligent attitude towards verifying the 
trustworthiness of its evidence. In particular, the incidents relating to Witness 4 are clearly 
indicative of a negligent attitude towards verifying the reliability of central evidence in the 
Prosecution’s case . . . . The Prosecution offered a number of explanations for overlooking the 
problems with Witness 4’s evidence. However, what all these explanations reveal is that there 
are grave problems in the Prosecution’s system of evidence review, as well as a serious lack of 
proper oversight by senior Prosecution staff. Clearly, thorough and comprehensive due 
diligence with regard to the reliability of the available evidence is an ongoing obligation of the 
Prosecution under article 54(1)(a), which is as important as the collection of that evidence 
itself. 
Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 4 
(April 26, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585626.pdf; cf. Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-
02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests (April 26, 
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf (internal citation omitted). 
 90.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Application 
Pursuant to Article 64(4) for an Order to Refer Back to Pre-Trial Chamber II or a Judge of the Pre-
Trial Division the Preliminary Issue of the Validity of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges or 
for an Order Striking Out New Facts Alleged in the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief and Request for an 
Extension of the Page Limit Pursuant to Regulation 37(2),” ¶ 18 (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1549410.pdf (“Astonishingly, the OTP deliberately misled the Singe Judge into 
believing that even ‘an anonymous summary of the material is likely to be [. . .] meaningless.’”). 
 91.  Id. (quoting Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application 
Requesting Disclosure After a Final Resolution of the Government of Kenya’s Admissibility 
Challenge” and Establishing a Calendar for Disclosure Between the Parties, ¶ 17 (April 20, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1061306.pdf). 
 92.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Reply to 
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on the information revealed. Where applicable, the defense should consider 
using the submissions of the prosecution in the less redacted versions of these 
applications in support of motions for the nonimposition or lifting of proposed 
or existing redactions. In particular, the defense may be able to demonstrate 
that the reasoning underlying the prosecution’s previous applications for 
redactions is without sufficient basis and that future applications for redactions 
should not be granted on this faulty basis. 
3. The Process of Imposing and Lifting Redactions and Its Impact on 
Defense Practices 
As discussed, the scope of redactions applied to the identifying information 
of witnesses, potential witnesses, victims, and “others at risk”93 is very wide 
under the court’s present practice. The imposition and then lifting of these 
redactions is a time-consuming and cumbersome process that is a drain on the 
prosecution and chamber’s time and resources and results in a negative impact 
on the work of the defense and fundamental rights of a suspect or accused 
person. 
Until the trial stage of Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang (Kenya I) and Kenya II 
cases, the practice of the ICC pre-trial and trial chambers had been to approve 
each and every redaction applied for by the prosecution for, at the very least, all 
incriminating disclosure.94 Trial Chamber V, in the two Kenya cases, sought to 
minimize the burden and delay caused by the court’s existent redaction regime, 
approving a proposal by the parties in which redactions to certain standard 
categories of information were imposed inter partes, without the chamber’s 
direct involvement.95 Under the protocol certified by the chamber the defense 
 
Confidential Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 Consolidated Prosecution Response to the 
Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statute to Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber”, Submitted on 7 March 2013, ¶ 19 (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1565107.pdf (detailing the efforts undertaken by the defense of Ambassador Muthaura 
and the defense of Mr. Kenyatta to obtain, from the prosecution, information relevant to the 
nondisclosure of Witness 4’s affidavit). 
 93.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for 
Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements,” ¶ 54 (May 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc492175.pdf. 
 94.  See Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction 
regime, ¶¶ 13-15 (Sep. 27, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1477182.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Muthaura and Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction 
regime, ¶¶ 13-15 (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1477186.pdf. In both decisions 
Trial Chamber V noted that Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Katanga case and Pre-Trial Chamber III in the 
Gbagbo case had required a case-by-case review of redactions requested for incriminatory materials, 
whereas here Trial Chamber V was authorizing a disclosure regime in which a case-by-case review 
would not be required for all types of disclosure (incriminatory, rule 77, and potentiality exonerating) 
with respect to certain standard categories of information for which redactions were requested. 
 95.  Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction regime, 
¶¶ 13-15 (Sep. 27, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1477182.pdf; Kenya II, Case No. ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on the Protocol Establishing a Redaction Regime, ¶¶ 13-15 (Sept. 27, 2012), 
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may now seek clarification from the prosecution as to the imposition of these 
propio motu redactions and then seek relief from the chamber if the matter 
cannot be settled inter partes.96 
However, as the authors’ experiences in both the Kenya I and Kenya II 
cases have revealed, the presumed benefit of speedier disclosure to the defense 
comes with a significant new burden in the defense having to review the propio 
motu redactions imposed by the prosecution, with little information as to the 
specific underlying justification for the redactions. The defense must decide for 
each disbursement of disclosure, and in a short time frame, whether further 
explanation need be sought from the prosecution for a redaction, and, if 
necessary, a challenge filed with the chamber seeking the immediate lifting of 
the redaction. 
The practical effect is the prosecution’s imposition of a high volume of 
redactions largely without the review of a chamber. This is no small thing given, 
as discussed above, the scope of redactions applied at the ICC and the risk of 
the imposition of improper redactions and withholding of information even 
with a chamber’s specific review of prosecution applications for nondisclosure. 
The process of lifting redactions presents its own set of difficulties for the 
defense. In particular, redactions to a single document are often lifted in 
piecemeal fashion over an extended period of time. In the Banda case, for 
example, this piecemeal approach to lifting redactions resulted in the disclosure 
of witnesses’ statements four, five, and even six times, with a few more 
redactions lifted on each occasion. Multiply this across various statements and 
annexes thereto, including hundreds of photographs, as well as videos, and the 
burden on the defense in having to continually reanalyze these disclosed items 
and act upon the newly revealed information is significant. 
Cocounsel for Mr. Kenyatta in the Kenya II case explained the situation 
facing the defense as such: 
So to touch upon the first point, if I may, the necessity of re-review, and I’d like to give 
you a concrete example. I’m going to take the witnesses 11 and 12, key witnesses 
which remain in this case relied upon by the Prosecution. The Prosecution has served 
79 transcripts of evidence in respect of these two witnesses together. Out of the 1,415 
pages, 1,021 pages were re-served lesser redacted and I can inform your Honours that 
from my personal experience of reading, re-reading, analysing and then of course 
preparing to segment the information that is necessary to be investigated, that this is 
not only an arduous task, but the fact of the lesser redaction makes it a task that must 
be repeated so that the key allegations are found and investigated properly in 
readiness for trial. . . . From the Defence perspective in terms of preparation for trial, 
the practical task of firstly counsel reviewing the material, and your Honour can 
imagine 79 transcripts takes time, each of which may be between ten to 25 pages, once 
 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1477186.pdf. 
 96.  See Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Protocol Establishing a Redaction Regime in the Case 
of The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Jousha Arap Sang (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1480387.pdf; Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Protocol Establishing a Redaction 
Regime in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Oct. 5, 
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1480394.pdf. 
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that task has been done, in the process of movement towards trial, the Prosecution has 
served the same material again to some extent with lesser redactions. So as counsel I 
need to go back through the material to see where the lesser redactions are and to 
review them within the context of the evidence that I had initially seen. . . . So your 
Honour can imagine the onerous nature of which that task is in respect of the Defence 
preparations and the Defence resources that need to be employed to make sure that 
that work is conducted properly.
97
 
With these experiences in mind, the defense should not blindly accept the 
presumed benefit of quicker disclosure that might come with a protocol-based 
disclosure process. In any event, the defense should expect to receive multiple 
less redacted versions of the same disclosed item and should take this into 
consideration for the planning of investigative activities, the organization of the 
defense team, and the allocation of resources. 
A defense counsel should put in place a system for reviewing and 
incorporating into defense analyses and investigative plans the various lesser-
redacted versions of a disclosed item as they are received from the prosecution. 
A defense team may wish to consider putting in place a system to log the 
location of redactions deemed to be of particular significance to ensure that 
when these redactions are lifted, the information is quickly and properly 
reviewed and utilized for the purposes of investigations and understanding the 
prosecution case theory. Further, as has been emphasized, the defense should 
be proactive in seeking information from the prosecution on the imposition of 
particular redactions and, if necessary, challenging the application of remaining 
redactions before the chamber. 
Of course, from the perspective of the defense, the end result of the 
disclosure and redaction regime that has developed at the ICC over the course 
of the last ten years is the necessity of allocating a substantial portion of limited 
defense time and resources to managing and litigating disclosure-related issues 
and the related difficulties imposed on defense investigations. All things being 
equal, the defense’s time and resources are better spent on the core defense 
activities of analyzing prosecution disclosure, conducting defense investigations, 
and building the defense’s strategy and theory of the case. 
B. The Burden and Consequences of Electronic Disclosure and the E-Court 
Protocol 
Pursuant to “E-court protocols” that have been drafted by the Registry and 
implemented by the chambers of the court since the case of Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga,98 evidence that a party intends to rely upon in court must be 
submitted in electronic format and in accordance with the requirements of the 
 
 97.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Transcript of Status Conference, 26:15–27:21 (Feb. 14, 
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1552621.pdf. 
 98.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Second Decision on the E-Court 
Protocol (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc454350.PDF. 
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e-court protocol in effect for that case.99 Although e-court protocols were not 
intended to apply to inter partes disclosure, out of practical necessity the 
prosecution has aimed to fulfill its disclosure obligations in accordance with the 
relevant e-court protocol. 
Because the e-court protocol requires that parties populate evidentiary 
disclosures with “metadata”—file identifying information—the prosecution has 
structured its (potential) evidence collection and processing framework with a 
view to meeting this requirement. Given that the prosecution has already 
processed its potential evidence in this manner, it is logical and efficient for the 
prosecution to disclose material to the defense in the same manner, instead of 
creating and utilizing a separate system for inter partes disclosure. 
Although perhaps pedantic, it is worth listing for sake of context the 
standard fields applicable in an e-court protocol using the e-court protocol 
implemented by the pre-trial chamber in the Kenya II case100: document ID, 
date filed in the record, document date, estimated date, document type, 
confidentiality level, title, author, author organization, recipient, recipient 
organization, parties to an agreement, language of the item, translation status, 
redaction version, redaction approval date, excerpt history, host document 
number, participant introducing the document, chain of custody, date source 
restriction lifted, source identity, search limitations (text searchable or not), and 
disclosure package. 
One need not understand the meaning of each of the fields listed to know 
that, in principle, such information may be of value and use to the defense (and 
later the judges) in understanding the provenance, background, and other 
pertinent information related to an item of evidence. However, the value of 
such information is only as good as the quality of the data entered into these 
fields. As we can attest, errors in the metadata attached to prosecution 
disclosure are not infrequent, sometimes resulting in the need for re-disclosure 
of the information. Differences in the parties’ understanding of the appropriate 
use and scope of metadata fields can also lead to confusion and disputes that 
weigh upon defense time and resources. 
Additionally, because e-court protocols are equally applicable to the 
prosecution and defense, the burden on the defense in complying with an e-
court protocol, particularly at the confirmation-of-charges stage, is especially 
great. While the prosecution has an entire section of professionals—the 
Knowledge Base Unit101—dedicated to e-court related issues, a defense team 
 
 99.  See, e.g., Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence 
Disclosure and Other Related Matters (April 6, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1052098.pdf. 
 100.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Unified Technical Protocol (“E-court Protocol”) for the 
Provision of Evidence, Witness and Victims Information in Electronic Form (April 7, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1052099.pdf. 
 101.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Prosecution’s Observations on 
the Revised Version of the E-court Protocol as Submitted by the Registrar (Aug. 17, 2009), 
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will generally have a single case manager responsible for the electronic 
processing of and manual input of the various metadata fields for each item of 
evidence it wishes to present at the confirmation hearing and at trial in 
accordance with the e-court protocol. 
As discussed earlier, the practice of the prosecution to disclose significant 
and substantial items of evidence, as well as the DCC, close to or at the thirty-
day deadline for preconfirmation disclosure, leaves the defense with scant time 
to process this information and modify and conduct additional investigations 
thereon. A defense team must therefore include within its plans the time 
necessary to transmit the evidence it collects and decides to rely upon at 
confirmation to its team members in The Hague for processing on an ICC 
computer, as well as undertake the task of metadata entry. At the confirmation 
stage of the Kenya II case, we can attest to a round-the-clock work schedule 
stretching over several days by the members of the Muthaura defense, both in 
Kenya and The Hague, in order to collect and process into the court’s electronic 
evidence system the results of last-minute defense investigations to meet the 
fifteen-day final deadline for the submission of defense evidence.102 Under these 
circumstances, errors in the electronic processing of evidence and the entry of 
metadata are to be expected, and the defense may find it necessary to request 
extensions of time to submit its evidence due to these severe time and resource 
constraints. 
The judges of the court, the Registry, the Office of the Prosecutor and the 
Offices of Public Counsel for the Defense (OPCD) and for Victims (OPCV) 
have recognized the centrality of the e-court system to the functioning of the 
court and the need to continually review and improve this system based on the 
experiences of the organs of the court and the defense.103 To this end, the 
Registry, in September 2010, established an E-court User Group made up of 
representatives from each of the organs of the court as well as the OPCD, 
OPCV, and the defense, with a mandate to discuss, research, and make 
recommendations regarding e-court issues.104 The group has, for example, 
drafted a unified e-court protocol to serve as a template upon which e-court 
 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc728461.pdf. 
 102.  For example, at the confirmation stage in the Kenya II case the Muthaura defense submitted 
into evidence the signed statements of fifty-one witnesses, plus summaries of the expected oral 
testimony of two additional witnesses. The prosecution relied upon the statements, interview 
transcripts, and summaries of evidence of twelve witnesses at the confirmation stage. See generally 
Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf 
(detailing some of the witness evidence submitted by the parties). The specific witness figures provided 
above are based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 103.  This conclusion is based on one of the author’s experiences as a member of the E-court User 
Group since March 2011. 
 104.  Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Submission of the Generic eCourt Protocol, 
3 n. 3 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1290865.pdf. 
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protocols in future cases may be based105 and has sought to address the 
particular difficulties facing the defense in working remotely in the field, 
especially with respect to access to and use of items disclosed electronically by 
the prosecution.106 
From the perspective of the defense, resolving disclosure-related issues at 
the ICC may often be the most pressing task confronting counsel in the process 
of defending his or her client. The defense must dedicate significant time and 
resources to understanding the disclosure system in place at the ICC, 
negotiating inter partes on disclosure matters, litigating and relitigating 
disclosure issues, planning investigative activities in light of the ICC redaction 
regime and practice of delayed prosecution disclosure, and complying with the 
e-court protocol. Although disclosure may seem to involve the most mundane 
of issues in the context of defending against the crimes specified in the Rome 
Statute, a defense counsel practicing before the ICC would be wise to plan for 
and address disclosure matters at the earliest of stages—as well as to be vigilant 
with respect to disclosure issues throughout a case. Such best practices will 
allow a defense counsel to focus defense resources and attention, in the most 
effective manner, on the core activities of the defense: analyzing the 
prosecution’s evidence and case theory, conducing defense investigations, and 
developing the defense’s own theory of the case. 
IV 
THE CONFIRMATION-OF-CHARGES STAGE: THE EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE 
PRACTICES 
The nonconfirmation of any charges against Callixte Mbarushimana (a 
former suspect in the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 
December 2011,107 and Henry Kosgey108 and Mohammed Hussein Ali109 (former 
suspects in the situation in the Republic of Kenya) in January 2012, as well as 
the prosecution’s admission that the charges against Ambassador Francis 
Muthaura in the Kenya II case “conceivably” should not have been 
confirmed,110 have demonstrated that the first decision of the court to decline to 
 
 105.  Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Registry submissions on the Generic E-court Protocol 
pursuant to Order ICC-01/09-01/11-427, 3 (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1437587.pdf. 
 106.  This information is based on one of the author’s personal knowledge as a member of the E-
court User Group. 
 107.  Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1286409.pdf. 
 108.  Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314535.pdf. 
 109.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314543.pdf. 
 110.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public Redacted Version of the 25 February 2013 
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confirm any charges against a suspect in Prosecutor v. Abu Garda in February 
2010111 was no aberration. Including the case of Ambassador Muthaura, against 
whom all charges have now been withdrawn,112 the prosecution has had a 
success rate of below sixty-five percent in those cases in which a confirmation 
decision has been rendered.113 The applicable standard of proof at the 
confirmation stage—”sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe”114—is, of course, lower than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
required to obtain a conviction at the trial stage. 
This high rate of defense success (or prosecution failure, depending upon 
one’s point of view) at the confirmation stage obscures the uncertainty that still 
exists with the confirmation process at the ICC and the risks for the defense in 
putting forth a full defense at confirmation. Article 61(8) of the Rome Statute 
provides that “where the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to confirm a charge, the 
 
Consolidated Prosecution Response to the Defence Applications Under Article 64 of the Statue to 
Refer the Confirmation Decision Back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ¶ 44 (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/d oc1557330.pdf (“[T]he Prosecution’s disclosure error could conceivably have 
affected the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to commit Mr Muthaura to trial.”). 
 111.  Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Feb. 8, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf. 
 112.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr 
Muthaura (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1568411.pdf. 
 113.  The other individuals against whom charges have been confirmed are Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 
2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sep. 
30 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf, (Mr. Chui has since been acquitted), Jean-
Pierra Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo (Jun. 15, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf, Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Prosecutor v. Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, 
Corrigendum of the “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges” (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1036947.pdf (the case against Mr. Jerbo has since been terminated following Mr. Jerbo’s 
reported death), William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 
(Jan. 23 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf, and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Kenya 
II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf. On June 
3, 2013, in the case of Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued the Decision 
Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome 
Statute. Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf. The majority of 
the chamber adjourned the confirmation-of-charges hearing and requested that the prosecution 
consider providing further evidence or conducting further investigation with respect to the charges 
preferred against the former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo. Id. ¶ 44. (Judge Fernández filed a 
dissenting opinion in the case. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Jun. 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf). 
The Chamber directed that the prosecution submit any further evidence no later than November 15, 
2013, along with a revised DCC. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision 
Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome 
Statute, 23 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf. 
 114.  Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 61(5). 
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Prosecutor shall not be precluded from subsequently requesting its 
confirmation if the request is supported by additional evidence.”115 Accordingly, 
even if the defense is wholly successful at confirmation, the prosecutor has the 
right to seek a new confirmation-of-charges hearing on the nonconfirmed 
charges based on “additional evidence.”116 
For example, with respect to Mr. Abu Garda, more than three years after 
Pre-Trial Chamber II declined to confirm any of the three war crimes charges 
preferred against him by the prosecution, the prosecution’s written briefing for 
the period of August 1 through 30, 2013 categorizes Mr. Abu Garda’s case 
under the heading “Prosecution to present additional evidence.”117 The court 
has not yet had the opportunity to address the scope and definition of 
“additional evidence” for the purposes of article 61(8). 
The nonconfirmation of all charges against a suspect is undoubtedly the 
optimal outcome for the defense. However, defense counsel should advise a 
client in the event of such an outcome that no statute of limitations exists for 
crimes under the Rome Statute, and that there is the possibility of a new 
confirmation hearing pursuant to article 61(8) of the Rome Statute. A counsel 
may wish to warn a client to act with caution and perhaps even consult with 
counsel when discussing matters related to the case with any person or party, 
such as members of the media. Further, counsel may need to consider what is 
the appropriate time period to retain the defense case file following a total 
nonconfirmation of charges.118 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, if the defense decides to put on as full 
a defense as is possible within the constraints of the confirmation-of-charges 
process, and one or more charges are confirmed against a suspect, the 
prosecution will have been given a full preview, if not the details, of the 
defense’s case strategy and potential evidence. With this information in hand, 
the prosecution can adapt its case strategy and continue its investigations within 
the framework of the confirmed case with a view to countering the defense’s 
expected case at trial. 
This reality begs a further question confronting defense counsel regarding 
the prosecution’s article 54(1)(a) obligation to “establish the truth” by 
“extend[ing] the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an 
 
 115.  Id. at art. 61(8). 
 116.  Id. 
 117. Briefing, Office of the Prosecutor, Issue #146, at 3 (Aug. 1–30, 2013), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/wb/OTP-Briefing-ED146-Eng.pdf. 
 118.  Article 19 of the Code of Professional Conduct for counsel requires a defense counsel to retain 
“files containing documents and records of work carried out in fulfillment of the [representation] 
agreement for five years,” after which “counsel shall seek instructions from the former client . . . with 
due regard to confidentiality.” Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Code of Professional 
Conduct for Counsel, Res. 1, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/4/Res.1 (Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/BD397ECF-8CA8-44EF-92C6AB4BEBD55BE2/140121/ICCASP432Res1_ 
English.pdf. 
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assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in 
doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”119 
To what extent can the prosecution continue its investigations following the 
confirmation-of-charges hearing, and what is the authority and responsibility of 
a pre-trial or trial chamber to evaluate whether a prosecution has in good faith 
sought to abide by its article 54(1)(a) obligations? 
As discussed above in the context of the Kenya II case,120 it appears the 
chambers of the court have thus far been willing to give the prosecution leeway 
in continuing its investigations after the confirmation-of-charges hearing and 
are reluctant to pass final judgment on whether the prosecution is properly 
fulfilling its article 54(1)(a) obligations.121 To give a concrete example, the 
prosecution’s case theory in the Kenya II case at confirmation was centered on 
three meetings during which the common plan was hatched and implemented.122 
The prosecution relied on the witness statements, interview transcripts, and 
summaries thereof of twelve witnesses at the confirmation-of-charges hearing, a 
handful of whom allegedly attended these supposed meetings, and who name 
other individuals who also supposedly attended these meetings.123 
It seems logical that the prosecution, pursuant to its article 54(1)(a) 
obligation to “extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
relevant”124 and to “investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally”125 would have at least attempted to contact the numerous individuals 
named by these witnesses as allegedly attending the meetings to verify the 
occurrence and content of these meetings. The prosecution did not. 
Instead, it was the defense of the three suspects that managed in just the few 
months prior to the confirmation hearing to contact and take sworn statements 
from almost every individual named by the prosecution’s witnesses as allegedly 
attending these meetings as well as individuals who would have had knowledge 
of events taking place at the sites of the alleged meetings or of the whereabouts 
of the suspects on the days of the alleged meetings.126 All of these individuals 
informed the defense that they were not aware of any attempt by the Office of 
the Prosecutor to contact them.127 Further, all of these individuals provided 
 
 119.  Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
 120.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 121.  See Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application pursuant to Article 
64(4) and Related Requests, ¶¶ 117-125 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1585619.pdf (noting that postconfirmation investigation by the prosecution may be appropriate in 
certain circumstances). 
 122.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 309-359 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc1314543.pdf. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Rome Statute, supra note 11. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
 127.  This statement is based on the authors’ knowledge. 
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information that refuted the fact that two of the meetings had taken place,128 
and with respect to the third meeting, stated that the content of the meeting was 
not what the prosecution’s witnesses claimed it to be.129 
The defense teams of all three suspects in the Kenya II case raised at the 
confirmation-of-charges hearing the issue of the prosecution’s article 54(1)(a) 
failures.130 In the decision on the confirmation of charges the majority 
accept[ed] the argument of the Prosecutor that his alleged investigative failure does 
not fall within the scope of the Chamber’s determination pursuant to article 61(7) of 
the Statute. . . . [T]he scope of determination under article 61(7) of the Statute relates 
to the assessment of the evidence available and not the manner in which the 
Prosecutor conducted his investigations.
131
 
However, defense counsel appearing before the ICC, when considering case 
strategy, should not yet write off the prosecution’s article 54(1)(a) obligations as 
mere window dressing without any direct consequence in the event of breach. 
Certain voices emanating from the bench hold the view that the chambers of 
the ICC retain the authority to rule upon issues arising from the prosecution’s 
article 54(1)(a) obligations. In a dissent from the same decision on the 
confirmation of charges, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul 
underline[d] . . . the absolute necessity for the Prosecutor to exhaust all ways and 
means to make the investigation ab initio as comprehensive, expeditious and thus as 
effective as possible, as required by article 54(1) of the Statute. I hold that it is not 
only desirable, but necessary that the investigation is complete, if at all possible, at the 
time of the Hearing, unless the Prosecutor justifies further investigations after 
confirmation with compelling reasons. . . . In case a Pre-Trial Chamber is not 
convinced that the investigation is complete, it may use its powers under articles 
61(7)(c) and 69(3) of the Statute in order to compel the Prosecutor to complete his 
investigation before considering committing any suspect to trial. I consider this issue 
to be of utmost importance for the success of this Court.
132
 
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, in a concurring opinion in the same case 
at the trial stage, analyzed the prosecution’s investigations during the 
confirmation and postconfirmation stages as follows: 
[T]here are serious questions as to whether the Prosecution conducted a full and 
thorough investigation of the case against the accused prior to confirmation. In fact, I 
believe that the facts show that the Prosecution had not complied with its obligations 
under article 54(1)(a) at the time when it sought confirmation and that it was still not 
even remotely ready when the proceedings before this Chamber started. In this 
 
 128.  See Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 337–40, 345, 348–55, 358 (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf. 
 129.  See id. ¶¶ 319-324. 
 130.  See id. ¶¶ 61-65. 
 131.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 63 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314543.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 48 (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf. 
 132.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, ¶ 57 (Jan. 
23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf. 
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regard, I stress the concerns expressed in the Decision about the overwhelming 
number of post-confirmation witnesses and the quantity of post-confirmation 
documentary evidence, as well as the very late disclosure of the latter. . . . In addition 
to insufficiently justifying the exceptional circumstances that meant it could not have 
taken these particular investigative steps prior to confirmation without unduly 
endangering the security of particular individuals, the Prosecution also did not offer 
cogent reasons for what led it to believe, prior to confirmation, that the situation of 
each of these persons would significantly change after confirmation or indeed that 
such a change actually occurred. . . . Based on the foregoing considerations, I find that 
the Prosecution failed to properly investigate the case against the accused prior to 
confirmation in accordance with its statutory obligations under article 54(1)(a) of the 
Statute. In so doing, the Prosecution has also violated its obligation under article 
54(l)(c) of the Statute to fully respect the rights of persons arising under the Statute.
133
 
A defense counsel planning his or her client’s strategy for the confirmation-
of-charges hearing should therefore consider the value of examining in detail 
the prosecution’s investigations from the vantage point of article 54(1)(a) of the 
Rome Statute. Even if charges against the client are confirmed for trial, as 
detailed above, the prosecution’s obligations pursuant to article 54(1)(a) of the 
Rome Statute remain a live issue with respect to the continuation of the 
prosecution’s investigations and the legitimacy of the use of the fruits of such 
investigations as evidence at trial or as the basis to request an amendment of 
the confirmed charges.134 
Coming back to the broader strategic issue of how counsel should approach 
the confirmation-of-charges hearing, counsel will need to weigh a number of 
factors in advising the client on the most appropriate path. These factors will 
include, first and foremost, the goals and wishes of the client. In Prosecutor v. 
Banda, the joint defense of the accused agreed with the prosecution to a “short-
form” confirmation hearing in which the defense pledged not to call evidence or 
contest, solely for the purposes of the confirmation hearing, the charges alleged, 
with a view to moving proceedings forward in as expeditious a manner as 
possible to the trial stage.135 
In view of the above-mentioned risk of revealing the core of the defense 
case to the prosecution at the confirmation stage, a defense counsel might—
after evaluating the strength of the prosecution’s case based on the evidence 
 
 133.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert to the Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ¶¶ 
1, 3, 5 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585626.pdf. 
 134.  See Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum to “Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s 
Request to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(9) of 
the Statute,’” ¶ 36 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1571050.pdf (“[I]n principle, 
the Prosecutor’s investigation ‘should largely be completed at the stage of the confirmation hearing’ . . . 
The underlying rationale is that the continued investigation should be related only to such essential 
pieces of evidence which were not known or available to the Office of the Prosecutor prior to the 
confirmation hearing or could not have been collected for any other reason, except at a later stage.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 135.  Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Joint Submission by the Office of the Prosecutor and the Defence 
as to Agreed Facts and Submissions Regarding Modalities for the Conduct of the Confirmation 
Hearing, ¶¶ 5-7 (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc955335.pdf. 
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disclosed and the DCC—choose to challenge only specific aspects of the 
prosecution’s case as opposed to undertaking a fuller defense. Additionally, 
factors such as limited time and defense investigative difficulties, as in the case 
of Prosecutor v. Abu Garda,136 may limit the extent to which the defense can call 
its own evidence, effectively limiting the defense to focusing the core of its case 
on challenging the sufficiency and probative value of the prosecution’s 
evidence. 
V 
CONDUCTING DEFENSE INVESTIGATIONS 
Conducting investigations for the purposes of proceedings before any of the 
ad hoc and hybrid international tribunals and courts as well as the ICC is a 
challenging endeavor. Locating witnesses on the ground in an ongoing or 
postconflict context who are willing and able to cooperate with an international 
judicial entity or the defense is a time- and resource-intensive undertaking. 
Interacting with potential witnesses who have experienced trauma or believe 
they or their families may be put at risk by participating in international 
proceedings requires careful planning and caution with respect to witness 
contact and communication, as well as relationship and expectation 
management and regular reassurances. 
Additionally, the international members of a defense team may not speak 
the language of the client or of potential witnesses, and differences between 
defense-team personnel and witnesses with respect to cultural norms and 
educational backgrounds may result in further obstacles to efficient and clear 
communications.137 If the case is a document-heavy one, as has often been the 
situation before the ICTY, or one involving large amounts of electronic media, 
as occurred in Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana before the ICC, significant defense 
resources must be dedicated to the organization and review of such items. 
What differentiates the conduct of investigations in cases before the ICC 
from those before the ad hoc and hybrid international tribunals and courts is 
the scope and nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction and the impact of the above-
discussed disclosure regime. The ad hoc and hybrid international tribunals and 
courts focus all of their human and physical resources on limited geographic 
areas. The ICC, by contrast, is a reactive institution that does not know where 
its next situation may arise or what the relevant avenue of jurisdiction—referral 
 
 136.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 137.  Professor Nancy Combs of William and Mary Law School, in a study of the judgments of the 
trial chambers of the ICTR, SCSL and SPSC, has proposed that the testimony of witnesses relied upon 
by these trial chambers may be of questionable value because, among other reasons, many witnesses 
lack the life experience and education needed to use maps or understand and answer basic questions 
regarding times, dates, and distances, and that further, the impact of “[c]ultural norms and taboos” may 
result in less than clear and accurate information being obtained from witnesses. NANCY COMBS, 
FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 4–5 (2010). 
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by a State Party or the UN Security Council, propio motu action by the 
prosecutor, or acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by a state that is not party 
to the Rome Statute—will be. 
A. The Impact of the ICC’s Globalized Jurisdiction on Defense Investigative 
Practices 
The ad hoc and hybrid international tribunals and courts have steadily built 
up their institutional knowledge and resources with respect to the history 
(including, importantly, the history of the conflict(s) in question), politics, 
culture, and languages of the discrete areas over which they exercise 
jurisdiction, as well as on-the-ground capacities and professional connections 
with civil-society members, government officials, and other local contacts. 
At present, the ICC has eight active situations that arose via four different 
avenues of jurisdiction: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central 
African Republic, Uganda and Mali (all via referral by a State Party); the 
Republic of Kenya (via prosecutorial propio motu jurisdiction in a State Party); 
Darfur, Sudan, and Libya (via UN Security Council referral); and Côte d’Ivoire 
(via prosecutorial propio motu jurisdiction in a non–State Party that has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court).138 The ICC must therefore allocate its 
limited resources among its many situations, and with each new situation start 
anew in building up the necessary human and physical infrastructure to carry 
out investigations and prosecutions, conduct outreach to victims and support 
the work of the defense. 
The impact of this reality on an ICC defense team is perhaps less obvious 
because the defense is not a part of the ICC but instead an independent and ad 
hoc entity. However, an ICC defense team, unlike its counterparts at the ad hoc 
and hybrid courts and tribunals, will not have the benefit of a large and 
experienced defense bar with extensive and broad substantive knowledge of the 
conflict in question and practical advice on planning and conducting 
investigations on the ground. The wealth of factual knowledge of the history 
and politics of a region, including a detailed accounting of the conflict in 
question, available, among other places, in judgments of trial chambers and 
through expert reports submitted by parties, are likewise in short supply at the 
ICC with its eight disparate situations and the comparatively limited number of 
active cases. Hiring qualified and knowledgeable investigators, resource 
persons, and language assistants will similarly be a much more involved 
undertaking than at the ad hoc and hybrid institutions, where the class of such 
individuals grows and becomes even more experienced and specialized as the 
years pass. 
 
 
 138. See Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations% 
20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx. 
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In short, a defense counsel representing a client before the ICC should be 
prepared to build his defense team from the ground up in every respect. The 
learning curve will be a steep one and take place in the absence of a large 
number of colleagues who understand and can provide advice regarding the 
specific state and conflict in question. 
 Therefore, arguably, the defense’s need for assistance from the court 
(particularly the court’s Registry) in supporting defense investigative activities 
is also much greater at the ICC than at the ad hoc and hybrid institutions. 
However, as alluded to above, the court is least able to provide such assistance 
due to the spreading of limited resources across multiple situations. For 
example, the Registrar of the ICC must make annual decisions with respect to 
the staffing levels or closure of field offices, which may have significant 
implications on the defense’s ability to conduct effective investigations in the 
field for the case in question.139 In our experience, even relatively mundane—
but critical—issues such as the issuance of travel visas for defense-team 
members and the transmission of defense requests for cooperation to states and 
international organizations through the assistance of the Registry are impacted 
by the court’s necessarily broad but sometimes shallow interactions and 
relationships with key personnel in States Parties, not to mention interactions 
with states not party to the Rome Statute. For example, in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Banda, the defense submitted an application requesting that the 
trial chamber order the issuance of an official request for cooperation to the 
government of Nigeria following the defense’s inability to obtain, even with the 
Registry’s assistance, a substantive response to a request for assistance 
submitted more than eighteen months earlier to the Nigerian government.140 
This being said, we must underline that in our interactions with the Registry, 
Registry officials and staff members have always acted as consummate 
professionals who have demonstrated a genuine willingness to constructively 
and, wherever possible, effectively assist and advise the defense. 
 
 
 139.  See, e.g., Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 10th Sess., Dec. 12-21, 2011, 
Proposed Programme Budget for 2012 of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 194, ICC Doc. ICC-
ASP/10/10 (July 21, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-10-
ENG.pdf (discussing the closure of various field offices). 
 140.  Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Public Redacted Version of “Defence Application Pursuant to 
Articles 57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an Order for the Preparation and Transmission of a 
Cooperation Request to the Government of Nigeria” Filed on 3 July 2013, ¶ 8 (Jul. 3, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1613082.pdf. Trial Chamber IV granted the defense application 
on September 12, 2013. Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Public Redacted Version of the Decision on the 
third defence application pursuant to Articles 57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1644021.pdf. On October 23, 2013, the ICC Registry informed Trial Chamber IV 
that the Nigerian government had submitted a response to the ICC’s cooperation request the preceding 
day, October 22. Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Second Report of the Registry concerning the “Decision 
on the third defence application pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute, ¶ 1, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1669325.pdf. 
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Although any one issue arising out of the context of the ICC’s globalized 
jurisdiction is not likely to significantly impact the manner in which a defense 
counsel conducts investigations, the cumulative impact of this reality is certainly 
one that counsel must recognize, understand, and seek to work within in 
endeavoring to achieve the ultimate goal of providing a suspect or accused 
person with full and effective representation in line with the client’s 
instructions. 
B. The Impact of the Type of Jurisdiction Exercised on Defense Investigative 
Practices 
As mentioned above, the ICC has now exercised jurisdiction under the four 
avenues available to it under articles 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute: (1) referral 
by a State Party to the Rome Statute,141 (2) the prosecutor’s initiation of an 
investigation with respect to a State Party in accordance with article 15 of the 
Rome Statute, (3) referral of a situation by the UN Security Council acting 
pursuant to chapter VII of the UN Charter, and (4) the prosecutor’s initiation 
of an investigation pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute with respect to a 
non–State Party that has accepted the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to 
article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. 
Although the particular manner under which the ICC exercises jurisdiction 
in a situation does not mathematically equate to the level of difficulty the 
defense will encounter when attempting to carry out investigations in a case, the 
exercise of a particular type of jurisdiction may reflect and reveal certain 
fundamental realities that a defense team will face, and that therefore impact 
the modalities of how a defense team conducts its investigations. 
Given that the ICC exercises complementary jurisdiction,142 a state must be 
either unable or unwilling to carry out genuine investigations or prosecutions of 
crimes falling within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court as set out in the 
Rome Statute. From the perspective of the defense, when the ICC decides to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of a self-referral, this suggests the logistical and 
security difficulties a defense team could face in attempting to conduct 
investigations given that the authorities of the state have been deemed 
unwilling or incapable of carrying out effective policing or prosecutorial actions 
with respect to the crimes in question. 
In the one instance that the ICC prosecutor has sought and been authorized 
to exercise propio motu jurisdiction on the territory of a party to the Rome 
Statute—the situation in Kenya143—the court’s “self-invitation” into a state with 
 
 141.  These referrals have all been self-referrals of a state to the ICC as opposed to one State Party 
referring a situation in another State Party to the ICC. See Situations and Cases, supra note 138 (noting 
that Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Mali have 
referred situations occurring in their territory to the ICC). 
 142.  Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 17. 
 143.  The prosecutor also sought permission and was authorized to open an investigation in Côte 
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a dynamic and contentious political process and a large and active media sector 
has fostered a climate in which the challenges facing defense teams involve 
intense media scrutiny and political maneuverings in addition to witness 
security concerns. Additionally, tensions between the government of Kenya and 
the ICC Office of the Prosecutor resulted in the Kenyan government filing in 
April of 2013 submissions challenging the prosecution’s public statements and 
court filings, which had alleged a lack of cooperation on the part of the Kenyan 
government with the court.144 
The court’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to a referral from the UN 
Security Council (as has been utilized in the situations in Darfur, Sudan, and 
Libya) has thus far presented the defense with the most challenging of scenarios 
in seeking to provide effective representation to a client facing charges before 
the ICC. As recently noted by Justice Richard Goldstone, former prosecutor of 
the ICTY and ICTR, 
[I]n the Sudan, in the Banda Jerbo case, the parties have had marginal access to 
witnesses, which has negatively impacted the defence’s ability to investigate through 
no fault of its own. This raises questions around the accused’s capacity to exercise the 
right to prepare his or her defence, and could result in an unfair trial.
145
 
In such a circumstance, and when applications to stay146 such proceedings 
have failed,147 defense counsel are faced with the very difficult, if not 
unprecedented,148 task of conducting investigations without a single member of 
the defense being able to legally and safely enter the area that is the subject of 
the ICC situation to conduct the most basic of investigative steps. The defense 
may be reduced to relying on other means of communication—primarily 
 
d’Ivoire, which accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to the procedure set out under article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute. Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11, Decision Pursuant 
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1240553.pdf. 
 144.  Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Government of Kenya’s Submissions on the Status of 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Court, or, in the Alternative, Application for Leave to 
File Observations Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 12, 24 (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1577521.pdf (“The Government of Kenya asserts that it has 
complied with its obligations under the Rome Statute in good faith and in a practical and effective 
manner . . . . [T]he Prosecution’s approach is that of a halfway house - alleging non-cooperation and 
delaying tactics by the Kenyan Government in support of its legal submissions and requested relief, 
without affording the Government of Kenya the opportunity to comment on and respond to these 
claims so as to expose or explain such assertions as false, incomplete, inaccurate or otherwise 
misleading.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 145. ICC’s Reliance on Live Witness Testimony at a Crossroads States New IBA Report, INT’L B. 
ASS’N (July 11, 2013), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=4470A96B-C4FA-457F-
9854-CE8F6DA005ED. 
 146.  See Prosecutor v. Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of 
Proceedings (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1296602.pdf. 
 147.  Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Decision on the Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of 
Proceedings, ¶ 160 (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1498141.pdf. 
 148.  Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 2 
(Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1296602.pdf. 
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telephone—in order to locate and conduct initial interviews with witnesses. 
When the communication infrastructure in the area in question is of limited 
availability and reliability, a counsel’s already-limited investigative tools are 
curtailed even further, and countless defense man-hours may need to be spent 
regularly calling phone numbers over periods of days and weeks, if not months, 
in the hope that a potential witness may eventually be reached and be willing 
and able to speak to the defense. 
In considering whether to ask willing potential witnesses located in a state 
hostile to the court to travel to a third-party state to meet with the defense,149 
defense counsel must take the most careful, considered, and difficult of 
decisions in determining the acceptable level of risk to a witness. When meeting 
with such a witness the defense must undertake all reasonable precautions to 
protect the anonymity and physical security of the individual and also be 
prepared to refer the witness to the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the court in 
the event an unanticipated security situation arises. Additionally, documentary 
evidence may take on more significance than it otherwise would,150 though it 
cannot counterbalance the significant difficulties arising out of an inability to 
locate and interview key witnesses. 
C. The Impact of the ICC Disclosure Regime on Defense Investigative 
Practices 
The ICC’s disclosure regime as it relates to the defense was examined at 
length in part III. The prosecution’s practice of delayed disclosure to the 
defense, the application of wide-ranging and significant redactions to disclosed 
items, and the piecemeal manner in which redactions are lifted over the course 
of months and years all result in defense investigative activities being unduly 
hampered and, potentially, investigative opportunities being lost in the event 
information is disclosed too late for the defense to take advantage of said 
information.151 
Delayed disclosure limits the time available to the defense to review and act 
upon the material received. When critical information remains redacted from 
the defense—such as the identity of a witness or the time and place of an 
alleged meeting—the defense can hardly be expected to conduct full and 
effective investigations on this basis. Indeed, late disclosure or the eventual 
lifting of a redaction to a crucial piece of information may necessitate the 
defense reinterviewing witnesses at the cost of limited defense resources. In 
circumstances such as those in the Banda case, where a witness may have 
travelled out of the situation area (in that case Darfur) to meet with the defense 
 
 149.  Id. ¶ 13–14. 
 150.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 151.  For example, as would be the case with disclosure of a phone number that no longer functions 
or disclosure of the identity of a potential witness only after the individual has died. 
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in a third state,152 the eventual lifting of redactions to photographs disclosed to 
the defense will be of little value if witnesses who may have been able to shed 
light on such items are no longer available to the defense. 
Given this state of affairs, defense counsel practicing before the ICC must 
structure their investigative activities and undertake their preparatory work in a 
manner that minimizes the impact, where possible, of the present ICC 
disclosure regime. For example, a well-organized and regularly updated record 
of prosecution disclosure will be crucial for a defense counsel to be able to 
readily identify and understand the significance of recently disclosed items of 
evidence or information that has been unredacted. This will allow the defense 
team to quickly incorporate said information into its ongoing investigations. 
Similarly, the defense cannot simply wait for the lifting of redactions to 
crucial passages of information that may come months or even years down the 
line. The defense must be proactive in seeking out this information itself—for 
example, the identities of persons whom the prosecution does not intend to call 
as witnesses who may have been present at pertinent events and locations. 
Suffice it to say, the ICC disclosure regime encourages a defense team to be 
flexible, organized, and efficient to effectively conduct investigations in defense 
of the client. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The popular image of a criminal defense attorney is that of an individual 
operator, whether brilliant and flamboyant, unswervingly resolute and 
passionate in defense of his or her client in the face of overwhelming odds (the 
fictional Atticus Finch of Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird comes to 
mind153), or perhaps—unfortunately—a figure viewed with some amount of 
scorn or wariness because he or she represents individuals accused of criminal 
offenses.154 As submitted in the introduction to this article, the work of a 
criminal defense attorney is not for the fainthearted. This is even truer in the 
context of international criminal cases—with the average defense team working 
against not only a better resourced prosecution but often in an environment of 
great prejudice due to the sometimes concerted negative public statements from 
third parties regarding the client and the crimes the client is alleged to have 
committed. 
 
 152.  Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings, ¶¶ 
13-14 (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1296602.pdf 
 153.  HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
 154.  See, for example, a 2002 report prepared for the American Bar Association that reveals that 
seventy-three percent of respondents to a survey agreed with the statement that “lawyers spend too 
much time finding technicalities to get criminals released.” LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCIATES, AM. BAR 
ASSOC., SECTION OF LITIG., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 8 
(2002), available at http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptions1.pdf. 
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From this vantage point, the actions of the defense would seem to be driven 
primarily by individual initiative, in which the personal attributes and 
experiences of particular defense counsel have a direct effect on the practices 
and decision making of defense teams. Practice theory reverses this popular 
looking glass and examines “practices not practitioners.”155 As we have explored 
in this article, practice theory provides a more analytical view and better 
understanding of the work of the defense before the ICC. The personal and 
professional attributes and experiences of individual defense counsel 
undoubtedly remain important factors in the decision-making and practices of 
the defense before the ICC. However, practice theory reveals that the scope of 
action available to defense counsel before the ICC is very much an incident of 
both macro and micro factors over which a defense counsel has little control. 
From a macroperspective, the Rome Statute and RPE set the substantive 
and procedural legal framework within which a defense counsel will operate 
when representing a client before the ICC. As noted in the introduction to this 
article, this framework is itself the result of a long and intensive process of 
discussion and negotiation involving a diverse array of actors seeking to address 
in a permanent fashion fundamental issues of criminal accountability for crimes 
that are of the greatest concern to the international community. Applicable 
codes of ethics and the integrity of individual defense counsel in steadfastly 
applying these fundamental principles provide the overarching framework 
within which counsel must operate. 
From a microperspective, the actions of the organs of the court—including 
the decisions of the pre-trial, trial and appeals chambers, the type of ICC 
jurisdiction exercised in a particular situation and the practical precedents set 
by other defense counsel—all influence the practices and decision-making of 
the defense on both a strategic level and on a day-to-day basis. In part III of this 
article we examined how the manner and timing of prosecution disclosure to 
the defense and the legal regime for disclosure at the ICC shape the manner in 
which a defense team deploys its resources and structures its evidence analysis 
and investigations. In particular, the prosecution’s practice of disclosing to the 
defense significant and substantial amounts of material at or close to disclosure 
deadlines at both the confirmation and trial stages, coupled with an overbroad 
and cumbersome redaction regime, results in defense teams having to backload 
and amend their strategic planning and ongoing investigations in the months, 
weeks, and even days prior to the commencement of the confirmation hearing 
or trial proceedings. Additionally, a significant proportion of precious defense 
resources and attention must be deployed toward inter partes communications 
regarding and the litigation of disclosure issues. The requirements of the e-court 
protocol, especially in the context of the disclosure process at the confirmation 
stage, add a very specific, but not insignificant, constraint on the manner in 
 
 155.  See NICOLINI, supra note 18, at 7. 
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which a defense team must prepare for the confirmation hearing and the 
defense case at trial. In short, an understanding of the disclosure framework at 
the ICC and the actions of other actors in this process as they impact defense 
teams are crucial to understanding how a defense counsel approaches the 
representation of a client before the ICC. 
In part IV practice theory was applied to the unique confirmation-of-
charges process at the ICC. Here, the decision-making of a defense counsel is 
shaped by the Rome Statute and RPE, the goals and instructions of the client, 
and strategic considerations in view of the possible outcomes of the 
confirmation process, with this last factor influenced by the results of past 
confirmation hearings before the ICC. 
In Part V we focused on the conduct of defense investigations before the 
ICC, examining how factors such as the ICC’s status as an institution of global 
reach and activity, the four bases upon which the court may exercise 
jurisdiction, and, as explored earlier, the process of disclosure at the ICC, 
influence a defense counsel’s approach to planning and conducting 
investigations. The spreading of the ICC’s resources across its various distinct 
situations, and a similar diversity in experience of defense-team personnel 
practicing within these situations, results in defense counsel and their teams 
having less in the way of institutional and defense-bar support and knowledge 
to rely upon in comparison to the ad hoc and hybrid courts and tribunals. 
Although no general rule applies as to how the particular type of ICC 
jurisdiction exercised in a situation may impact defense investigations, the 
jurisdiction exercised is part and parcel of the overall context pertaining to that 
situation (which includes the security situation on the ground, communication 
and transport infrastructure in the area in question, the history of the conflict, 
and the languages and cultural and social norms of the peoples involved in or 
otherwise touched by the conflict). Darfur, Sudan, a situation referred to the 
ICC by the UN Security Council over the objections of the government of 
Sudan, provides perhaps the starkest example of how the type of ICC 
jurisdiction exercised may impact the process of defense investigations. Because 
neither the defense nor the organs of the court can legally and safely enter and 
conduct investigations on the territory of Sudan, the defense is limited to 
conducting investigations by phone and otherwise expending significant 
resources in attempting to arrange for the safe round-trip travel of willing 
witnesses to third states in order to meet with the defense. 
The security situation of witnesses in this context takes on an even greater 
import given that the court is unable to provide any measure of protection or 
assistance to witnesses located in Sudan, as does the collection of documentary 
evidence including information provided by states and international 
organizations. As discussed earlier, the process of disclosure at the ICC also 
impacts the conduct of defense investigations. The prosecution’s practice of late 
disclosure of significant amounts of critical incriminatory, exonerating and 
otherwise relevant items, as well as the heavy and broad regime of redactions 
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applied at the ICC, require the defense to structure their evidence analysis and 
investigation strategy to take into account this reality. 
An examination of these three defense phenomena—approaches to 
disclosure, the confirmation-of-charges process and investigations—through the 
lens of practice theory reveals that the considerations and actions of ICC 
defense counsel, and the issues a defense counsel will face in practicing before 
the ICC may be understood, and perhaps even predicted in a general sense, 
from the very start of a counsel’s engagement in a case. Disclosure issues will 
pervade throughout an ICC case and greatly influence a defense counsel’s 
actions and decisions with respect to resource allocation, litigation priorities, 
formation of case strategy, and conduct of investigations. A counsel’s approach 
to the confirmation-of-charges hearing will depend on, among other things, the 
client’s goals and instructions and strategic considerations unique to the ICC 
process. The conduct of defense investigations at the ICC, as revisited 
immediately above, is likewise a phenomenon that arises from the particular 
context of the ICC as a global institution with different avenues of jurisdiction 
and a disclosure process that requires significant defense resources and careful 
attention. 
Of course, the effective representation of a client, in the end, will always fall 
upon the individual shoulders of a defense counsel. This is how it should be. 
Whilst the practices described above set the framework within which the ICC 
defense operates, a defense counsel’s individual skill and experience, as well as 
his or her determination to adhere to the best standards of deontology will 
ultimately determine the quality and effectiveness of representation that a 
suspect or accused person will receive before the ICC. 
